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1)Markets in China and Europe on the Eve of the Industrial Revolution
Abstract
Why did Western Europe industrialize first? An influential view holds that its exceptionally well-functioning markets supported with a certain set of institutions provided the incentives to make investments needed to industrialize. This paper examines this hypothesis by comparing the actual performance of markets in terms of market integration in Western Europe and China, two regions that were relatively advanced in the preindustrial period, but would start to industrialize about 150 years apart. We find that the performance of markets in China and Western Europe overall was comparable in the late eighteenth century. Market performance in England was higher than in the Yangzi Delta, and markets in England also performed better than those in continental Western Europe. This suggests strong market performance may be necessary, but it is not sufficient for industrialization. Rather than being a key condition for subsequent growth, improvements in market performance and growth occurred simultaneously.
Bibliographic Information
• Markets in China and Europe on the Eve of the Industrial Revolution
• Carol H. Shiue and Wolfgang Keller
• The American Economic Review
• Vol. 97, No. 4 (Sep., 2007) (pp. 1189-1216)
• Page Count: 28
2)Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht
Abstract
At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.
Bibliographic Information
• Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht
• Wayne Sandholtz
• International Organization
• Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1993) (pp. 1-39)
3)Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union
Abstract
We compare monetary union to flexible exchange rates in an asymmetric, three-country model with active monetary policy. We find that countries with a high degree of nominal wage rigidity benefit from monetary union, especially when they join other, similarly rigid countries. Countries with relatively more flexible wages tend to be worse off in unions with countries that have more rigid wages. We examine France, Germany and the UK and find that the welfare implications of monetary arrangements depend more on the degree of wage asymmetry than on other types of asymmetries and that the higher wage flexibility in the UK would make its participation in EMU costly.
Bibliographic Information
• Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union
• Harris Dellas and George Tavlas
• The Economic Journal
• Vol. 115, No. 506 (Oct., 2005) (pp. 907-927)
4)The Economic Future of Europe
Abstract
An abstract for this item is not available.
Bibliographic Information
• The Economic Future of Europe
• Olivier Blanchard
• The Journal of Economic Perspectives
• Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004) (pp. 3-26)
5)The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability
• Martin Feldstein
EMU would be an economic liability. A single currency would cause at most small trade and investment gains but would raise average cyclical unemployment and would probably raise inflation, perpetuate structural unemployment, and increase the risk of protectionism. EMU is nevertheless being pursued in order to create a political union. Fundamental disagreements among member states about economic policies, foreign and military policies, and the sharing of political power are likely to create future intra-European conflicts. A united Europe would be a formidable participant in the 21st century's global balance of power, with uncertain consequences for world stability and peace.
www.nber.org/papers/w6150 - 24k - 1998-02-01
6)U.S. Budget Deficits and the European Economies: Resolving the Political Economy Puzzle
Martin Feldstein
This paper, prepared for the annual meetings of the American Economic Association, discusses how the increases in the U.S. budget deficits since 1980 have affected the economies of Western Europe. The analysis emphasizes that U.S. deficits have not only affected these economies directly but have also induced them to adopt more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies than they would otherwise have chosen. This induced shift in domestic policies is the primary reason why European governments have pressed for a reduction in the U.S. budget deficits despite the favorable impact of those deficits on European trade surpluses.
www.nber.org/papers/w1790 - 24k - 1986-12-01
7)What Determines European Real Exchange Rates?
Martin Berka, Michael B. Devereux
We study a newly constructed panel data set of relative prices of a large number of consumer goods among 31 European countries. We find that there is a substantial and non-diminishing deviation from PPP at all levels of aggregation, even among eurozone members. However, real exchange rates are very closely tied to relative GDP per capita within Europe, both across countries and over time. This relationship is highly robust at all levels of aggregation. We construct a simple two-sector endowment economy model of real exchange rate determination. Simulating the model using the historical relative GDP per capita for each country, we find that for most (but not all) countries there is a very close fit between the actual and simulated real exchange rate.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15753
